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Response
Amy Damon
Economic development theory and practice have been both highly 
contentious and vigorously debated over the past several decades. 
The debate ignites passion from civil society, academics, development 
professionals, communities in the Global South, and owners of global 
capital, all of whom, at times, disagree as to how to reduce global 
poverty, decrease inequality, and promote the equitable distribution 
of resources. For many years, development professionals have been 
looking for a “magic bullet” to achieve poverty reduction. Some seri-
ous candidates include international trade, foreign aid, and economic 
growth, or a combination of the three. However, after more than a half 
a century of effort, almost half the world still lives on less than $2.50 
per day, and stark inequality and poverty persist.
Professor Ravi Kanbur elegantly maps the evolution of develop-
ment debates from the Second World War to the present, highlighting 
the formulation and discourse of economic development by multilat-
eral development banks, policymaking elites, and those whom Kanbur 
refers to as “Ministry of Finance types.” In Section II, Kanbur takes 
up the origin and evolution of the meanings of the term “Washington 
Consensus.” He suggests that the original formulation of the Washing-
ton Consensus, as defined by John Williamson, was broader than its 
current meaning, initially including a reallocation of resources away 
from non-merit subsidies and toward pro-poor services like health 
care, education, and infrastructure. He recognizes, however, that the 
term Washington Consensus became shorthand for a set of neo-liberal 
economic policies adopted in the 1980s and 1990s, which became a 
focal point for those strongly critical of the development establish-
ment. Those critics are characterized by Kanbur as “leftist,” “statist,” 
or others opposed to neo-liberal development policies. The author cor-
rectly asserts that the Washington Consensus became more about the 
outcomes of its policies, rather than the content of the original docu-
ment. He suggests that people on both sides of the Washington Con-
sensus debate became polarized and less nuanced because of the vigor 
of the development debate.
In Section III, Kanbur provides a brief history of development over 
the past sixty years, situating economic policies on a neo-liberal versus 
non-neo-liberal continuum. He suggests that the policy focus shifted 
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during this time period from a statist approach, which co-existed with 
the inception of the World Bank, to an approach focused on economic 
growth and globalization. Kanbur posits that the reason for this shift 
came in the 1960s and 1970s, when people observed that economic 
growth, along with improved equity in East Asia, had a significant 
impact on poverty. Observing this experience, the development profes-
sion began to refocus on the importance of growth and trade liberaliza-
tion. This set the stage for the 1980s, when the debt crisis experienced 
by many countries encouraged a focus on export-led development and 
trade liberalization to generate foreign exchange. During that era and 
continuing today, many view economic growth via trade liberaliza-
tion as the most effective means to reduce poverty. Kanbur describes 
the tide of policymaking during the 1980s and 1990s moving toward 
those who believed in the Washington Consensus. However, he notes 
that the challenges brought about by this consensus appeared quickly. 
He explores five examples of these challenges, citing the East Asia 
financial crisis of 1997; the disastrous experience of most transition 
countries in Eastern Europe; countries in Africa and Latin America that 
followed the prescribed development path yet failed to see the results; 
the rapid growth of India and China, which did not follow this pre-
scription; and the rise in inequality within rapidly growing countries. 
He argues that examples such as these have led to a rethinking of eco-
nomic development discourse, possibly leading to the emergence of a 
new consensus.
Kanbur argues that through an accumulation of facts “on the 
ground” and increasingly vocal criticism from opposition groups in 
civil society, the perspective from inside elite development policy cir-
cles began to shift away from the staunch defense of capital-account 
and trade liberalization to an increasing focus on the impact of growth, 
distribution, and direct interventions to mitigate the worst outcomes 
of poverty and rising inequality. This new perspective is reflected in 
the wide adoption of development programs such as conditional cash 
transfer programs and the Millennium Development Goals, and also 
by the Growth Commission report, which Kanbur claims back down 
from the certainties of the virtues of trade and export-driven devel-
opment toward a more distribution-focused agenda. Some have sug-
gested that this shift away from trade and growth toward a broad set 
of policy goals has led to a “Washington Confusion.”
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*****
Kanbur suggests in his concluding comments that the transformation 
of the Washington Consensus to the Washington Confusion may be 
exactly the transformation we need for a more open dialogue about 
development options in general. I could not agree more. In this sec-
tion, I will build on Kanbur’s idea that the Washington Confusion 
presents opportunities for improved development practices. Before an 
exploration of the Washington Confusion, the formation of a develop-
ment problematique warrants discussion. In order for development to 
be conceptualized, a necessary dichotomy must be defined between 
the developers and those that need to be developed. In the case of 
the post-World War II paradigm, the process of development necessi-
tated a categorization of countries into “developed” and “developing,” 
which closely mirrored patterns of colonization. A critic of develop-
ment, Latouche states:
The newly independent states were caught in insoluble contradictions. 
They could neither disregard development nor carry it out. They could, 
consequently, neither refuse to provide nor succeed in providing all that 
is necessary to modernization: education, medicine, justice, administra-
tion, technology… . Though theoretically reproducible development is 
not universalizable. First for ecological reasons: the limits of the planet 
would make the generalization of the American way of life disastrous 
and impossible.1
Yet another development critic further defines the development 
dichotomy:
Development discourse wishes to present itself as a detached center of 
rationality and intelligence. The relationships between West and non-
West will be constructed in these terms. The West possesses the exper-
tise, technology and management skills that the non-West is lacking. 
This is what has caused the problems of the non-West.2
The construction of a classification that places nations into the 
developing or developed country category is useful in the process of 
development, primarily through example. In a developed country, we 
see an example of an end goal: what should be. Further, the narrative 
of development suggests that the gap between developed and devel-
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oping countries can be bridged through a development “process” that 
moves a country along a development trajectory.
Throughout the historical perspective of economic development 
provided by Kanbur there is an underlying assumption of the exis-
tence of a development trajectory. The idea of a development tra-
jectory, or a development path, is appealing because it implies that 
there is a formula for economic development, and—if it is applied 
appropriately—a country, community, or household will move down 
a path toward the defined end goal, be it better education, economic 
growth, reduced poverty, etc. The statists, in the post-Second World 
War development era, believed that this development trajectory could 
be achieved by heavy government intervention through price supports 
and subsidies. The Washington Consensus believed that this trajectory 
could be achieved through trade and capital account liberalization, 
reduction of state market intervention, and globalization. Still further, 
I would argue that while the current focus on redistribution, poverty 
reduction, and growth may be a closer compromise between statists 
and neo-liberals, it still subscribes to a development trajectory.
This critique of a development trajectory model by no means intends 
to reject the virtuous end goals of development. Surely we cannot 
ignore the masses of hungry people, poorly distributed resources, and 
lack of access to health care, sanitation, and other services. Debraj Ray 
takes a more moderate approach in defining development by suggest-
ing:
No one in their right mind would ever suggest that economic develop-
ment be identified, in a definitional sense, with the level of growth of 
per capita income. It is perhaps universally accepted that development 
is not just about income, although income has a great deal to do with it. 
This means, in particular, that development is also the removal of pov-
erty and undernutrition: it is an increase in life expectancy; it is access to 
sanitation, clean drinking water, and health services; it is the reduction 
of infant mortality; it is increased access to knowledge and schooling, 
and literacy in particular.3
The transition from the Washington Consensus to the Washington 
Confusion provides, if not a means to deconstruct a development path, 
then an opening to question its uniform application across cultural, 
political, and ecological contexts. In addition, the Washington Confu-
sion represents a weakness in the ideological fortress represented in 
the Washington Consensus. It provides an opportunity for diverse per-
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spectives to be included in the future development projects born out 
of the new politics of the Washington development machine. The next 
section explores the process and potential impact of the democratiza-
tion process.
*****
Both statists and neo-liberals subscribe to some notion of a develop-
ment path leading to a certain set of development goals. Kanbur does 
not divulge his own thoughts about the end goals of development. 
It seems that capital accumulation and the globalization of this accu-
mulated capital in order to achieve an end goal of Western-defined 
living standards is an inherent feature of the development discourse 
presented throughout his essay. Yet the current Washington Con-
fusion leaves the door open to debate questions such as: What are 
development policy objectives and who should identify them? How 
does the debate around development activities address or even define 
these aims? Unfortunately, the Washington Confusion only represents 
increasing heterogeneity on the process of development itself.
To effectively implement a truly heterogeneous and disaggregated 
development approach, the end goals of development should reflect 
this same heterogeneity. They should be defined by the “objects” of 
development themselves: the states, communities, and households 
that suffer from unacceptably low living standards. It is only with the 
redefinition of development goals, which reflect the diversity of the 
“underdeveloped” communities, that we can achieve a stable hetero-
geneous development system.
How can a development discourse evolve to include these voices 
and legitimize the articulated needs of this constituency? In other 
words, how do we democratize development such that the discourse is 
debated outside the political spectrum of both the “Left” and “Right”? 
Genuine progressive development reform will come through the gen-
eration of a mechanism that provides an aggregate picture of the col-
lective wants and needs of diverse global communities.
In Kanbur’s historical review of the shifting development discourse, 
little is discussed about the underlying power dynamics that create 
ownership within the system. The development industry described 
by Kanbur firmly leaves control of the development paradigm in the 
hands of development professionals in multilateral banks, “Ministry 
of Finance types,” and other development elites, who respond slowly 
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to failed policies and external criticism. The evolution of development 
discourse took years to shift and only responded because of the willing 
acceptance of development elites. Given this slow, almost bureaucratic 
response, we are left with the collective challenge of creating a system 
that can be continually updated to reflect a broad set of opinions and 
that can effectively respond to the needs of a constantly shifting and 
extremely diverse constituency.
It is such an old argument that it almost sounds cliché: Give commu-
nities a voice in decision making about their own development through 
“participatory development.” The implementation of this concept has 
been spotty, at times paternalistic, and generally not very effective. The 
institutional development structures in place are too entrenched in a 
power structure that replicates historical ones, and perpetuates sup-
ply side development interventions. The industry creates goals and 
programs to meet these goals, presents these programs and goals to 
communities and states, and then asks for them to be partners in these 
goals.
I would argue that we need a different set of goals. Development 
agencies should institute a set of goals for their own internal transfor-
mation that fundamentally devolves decision-making power to the 
people they are trying to assist. This devolution would help to trans-
form the development process into a truly demand-driven industry. In 
doing so, developing states would then be able to communicate their 
preferences and unique development goals, and work with funding 
agencies to meet them.
Development agencies should organize around the question of how, 
ultimately, do we democratize development? They should examine 
the communication structures that allow communities to decide on 
development projects and ultimately have veto power. For example, 
we could invest in new technologies that allow better information and 
more inclusion in the development process, from the individual to 
the development agency. To illustrate, let’s say a community identifies 
a problem involving water sanitation. The community decides that 
it needs funding for a new sanitation system, including a well and a 
sewer system. The community or state takes bids from different devel-
opment agencies and then decides which is best equipped to handle 
such a project. Community members could receive current information 
about the bidding process and even vote, using cell phone technology, 
on different projects.
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*****
Kanbur describes the emergence of a new consensus, which has 
responded to the criticisms of the Washington Consensus and the evi-
dence of its failures. The newly emerging consensus, as Kanbur indi-
cates, is reflected in the Growth Commission report. It acknowledges 
the inability to design development policies that work across country 
contexts. It also maintains that distributional concerns are central, and 
that improved education, health, and the environment should be inte-
gral to any development policy. However, even with a shift in develop-
ment rhetoric, current international development programs continue 
to replicate historical power relationships, uniformity in development 
policy and program implementation, and the notion that there is a pre-
scribed set of steps that will achieve the elusive quest for development. 
This section critically examines Millennium Development Goals, the 
Millennium Challenge Account, to see if these “new” programs repre-
sent a new generation of development projects or more of the same old 
business.
*****
In September 2000, the United Nations hosted the largest gathering of 
heads of state. They unanimously adopted a set of goals in line with 
the new consensus on development. Goals were set in eight areas to 
reduce poverty, child mortality, and disease; increase levels of educa-
tion, gender equality, maternal health, and environmental steward-
ship; and improve global partnerships. By all accounts these goals 
exhibit a reoriented perspective toward generally accepted measures 
of improved livelihoods. The architects of the Millennium Develop-
ment Goals (MDGs) apparently did not learn from the failure of the 
one-size-fits-all policies of the 1980s and set targets that can in no way 
be universally achieved. Additionally, some countries are striving to 
accomplish these goals without addressing the fundamental structural 
conditions that underpin many of the problems. In essence, the MDGs 
have become a new rallying cry for increased foreign aid and a new 
push for economic growth.
This model is problematic for several reasons. First, although the 
structural mechanisms that create conditions of poverty and inequality 
are still in place, the goals are to be met through a massive uptick in 
foreign aid, greater trade access, and debt reduction. Regrettably, none 
of these mechanisms, meant to facilitate achievement of the MDGs, 
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addresses underlying institutional and structural problems, which are 
highly heterogeneous across countries. It has been suggested that $50 
billion more a year in aid will achieve the MDGs.4 However, the focus 
on aid misses the point.
The critique presented in this essay questions the method of setting 
universal development goals across the board for all countries, regard-
less of context. Under the new development consensus, recognizing 
the importance of more “human development” goals still misses the 
point. The MDGs set most countries on a path to failure. These goals 
universally call for halving poverty across the board, but the multi-
plicity of reasons why poverty exists goes unaddressed. The goals fail 
to acknowledge the agency of individuals, communities, and states 
in their own process of development, but rather present an arbitrary 
set of goals that everyone ought to achieve. Furthermore, these goals 
are difficult to contest. Who, after all, would argue against improved 
maternal health care or better education? But again, this is not the 
point. The question is why have individual countries not set their own 
goals according to their own preferences? In addition, if foreign aid is 
needed to run such programs, why not set up funds to support self-
determined development efforts?
*****
In an effort to target foreign aid toward the achievement of the MDGs, 
the United States has set up the Millennium Challenge Account, 
administered by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC). This 
new development agency will attempt to direct United States’ develop-
ment assistance to countries that achieve a set of performance indica-
tors. These indicators include features of governance, such as political 
rights, civil liberties, and government effectiveness; human develop-
ment measures, such as health and education expenditures, immuni-
zation rates, etc.; and facets of economic freedom, such as regulatory 
quality, land rights and access, fiscal policy, and inflation policy.
The achievement of certain standards within these criteria allows 
a country to be eligible for MCC assistance. MCC takes the process of 
external goals one step further by making aid to achieve the MDGs 
contingent upon the achievement of yet another set of goals. This pro-
cess is a stark example of how the implementation of the so-called 
new consensus is more business as usual. The functioning of the MCC 
does nothing to devolve power or agency to the objects of develop-
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ment themselves. Instead, it adds another layer of power held by, in 
this case, the United States, by allowing it to determine who gets the 
money and for what reasons.
*****
This response comments on Professor Kanbur’s essay describing the 
development debate over the past half century and builds on several 
concluding points by the author. Specifically, the response further elab-
orates upon Kanbur’s optimism about the evolution of the Washington 
Consensus to the Washington Confusion. It explores the importance 
of democratizing development and discusses the problems inherent 
in universal development goals. The Millennium Development Goals 
and the Millennium Challenge Account are used as examples of the 
perpetuation of the development paradigm under the new Washing-
ton Confusion.
I conclude that more innovative thinking is needed to develop a set 
of mechanisms that truly devolves the power structure of the develop-
ment process to its constituents. We need creative ideas to address not 
just the enormous problems that currently exist, but to improve the 
process by which these problems are addressed.
Notes
1. Serge Latouche, “To be finished, once and for all, with development,” Le Monde Diplo-
matique (May 2001).
2. Timothy Mitchell, “The Object of Development: America’s Egypt,” in The Power of 
Development, edited by Jonathan Crush (London: Routledge, 1995).
3. Depraj Ray, Development Economics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998).
4. Michael Clemens and Todd Moss, “Ghost of 0.7%: Origins and Relevance of the Inter-
national Aid Target,” Working Papers 68, Center for Global Development (2005).
